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MEDIMMUNE, INC. v. GENENTECH,
INC.: A PATENT LICENSEE DOES
NOT NEED TO TERMINATE OR
BREACH A LICENSE AGREEMENT
IN ORDER TO CHALLENGE ITS
VALIDITY OR ENFORCEABILITY
C. TYLER OHANIAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., asks whether Article III’s
restriction on the jurisdiction of the federal courts only to “cases” and
“controversies,”1 as required by the “actual controversy” limitation of
the Declaratory Judgment Act,2 necessitates that a patent licensee
terminate or breach its license agreement before seeking a
declaratory judgment to hold the underlying patent invalid,
unenforceable, or not infringed. The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the appellate court responsible for hearing all patent appeals,
had established that a company licensing a patent must infringe a
patent, which risks subjecting the licensee to treble damages, in order
to challenge the validity of that patent in court to prevent a licensee
from hedging its bets by simultaneously paying for the patent license
and challenging the patent’s validity.3
Justice Scalia, writing for an eight-member majority, rejected the
argument advanced by Genentech—that MedImmune, Inc., could not
sue because it had voluntarily entered into the licensing agreement
with Genentech and continued to pay all required royalty payments—

* 2007 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1993).
3. See generally Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (patent
licensee must breach or terminate license to challenge the validity of the licensed patent).
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4
and overruled the Federal Circuit’s precedent. Instead, the Court
held that a challenge to the validity of a patent is now a justiciable
controversy for which a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction,
regardless of whether the licensee first breaches the licensing
agreement.5

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
MedImmune, Inc., the petitioner, is a biotechnology company that
produces and markets a drug used to prevent potentially fatal
6
respiratory disease in infants and young children. This drug,
distributed under the trademarked name “Synagis,” accounts for more
7
than eighty percent of petitioner’s sales revenue since 1999. In 1997,
one year before Synagis was marketed, petitioner entered into a
licensing agreement with the respondent, Genentech, Inc.8 Under the
licensing agreement, the petitioner agreed to pay royalties to the
respondent if it sold any products covered by one of the licensed
patents, including the “Cabilly II” patent held by the respondent,
9
which was ultimately challenged and resulted in this case.
Following the signing of the licensing agreement, Genentech
delivered a letter to MedImmune stating its belief that the product
Synagis fell under the Cabilly II patent and, therefore, royalties
should be paid in accordance with the terms of the licensing
10
agreement. This letter clearly threatened that Genentech would seek
to enforce the Cabilly II patent. Although MedImmune did not
believe the Cabilly II patent was valid and enforceable, it feared the
potential costs if Genentech succeeded in enforcing the license
agreement or enjoining the sale of Synagis. MedImmune was
confronted with a difficult decision: continue to pay royalties despite
feeling that they were not owed or breach the licensing agreement
and challenge the validity of the patent. Fearful of the serious
consequences associated with breaching or terminating the licensing
agreement, especially the risk of treble damages, MedImmune paid all

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2007).
Id.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 767–68.
Id.
Id. at 768.
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royalties requested by Genentech, but did so “under protest and with
11
reservation of all [its] rights.”
MedImmune subsequently filed suit against Genentech in the
United States District Court for the District of Central California,
seeking a declaratory judgment to declare the Cabilly II patent
unenforceable or invalid. At the same time, MedImmune continued to
12
pay all demanded royalties under protest. The district court granted
Genentech’s motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment claims for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.13 In doing so, the district court
14
relied on Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. The Federal Circuit had held
in Gen-Probe that a patent licensee in good standing cannot establish
an Article III case or controversy with regard to validity,
enforceability, or scope of a patent because the presence of a license
agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that the
licensee will be sued for infringement.15 Although the district court
intimated that it had “serious misgivings” about the practical
application of the Gen-Probe rule, it concluded there were not
sufficient facts to distinguish the case from the facts of Gen-Probe.16
Therefore, the court was obligated to follow precedent and dismissed
17
Medimmune’s case. On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, also
citing Gen-Probe as the binding precedent.18
The Federal Circuit’s 2004 Gen-Probe decision required a licensee
to breach or terminate the licensing agreement in order to bring a
challenge to the patent’s validity because this was seen as creating an
actual controversy.19 However, a landmark 1969 Supreme Court case,
Lear v. Adkins, held that patent licensees are not barred from
challenging the validity of the patents they have licensed simply by
virtue of the contractual relationship created by the licensing

11. Id. at 768 (quoting Joint Appendix 426).
12. Id. at 767–68.
13. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP (CTX), 2004 WL 3770589
(C.D. Cal., Apr. 26, 2004).
14. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
15. Id. at 1381.
16. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP (CTX), 2004 WL
3770589, at *6 (C.D. Cal., Apr. 26, 2004) (“Even if it has serious misgivings about the panel's
conclusion, this Court is not free to reconsider policy ramifications that Gen-Probe rejected.
There are no relevant facts that distinguish this case from the facts of Gen-Probe.”).
17. Id.
18. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964–965 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
19. Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1382.
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20
agreement. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. provided an
opportunity to reconcile these differences.

III. HOLDING
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to decide if
termination or breach of a licensing agreement is a necessary
precondition to bring a suit challenging the validity or enforceability
of a patent. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. offered the Supreme
Court an opportunity to clarify the legal landscape in an evolving area
of intellectual property law. In amicus briefs, many large companies
with extensive portfolios of patented intellectual property argued the
licensor’s position that a licensee cannot retain the benefit of the
licensing agreement by paying all necessary fees while simultaneously
challenging the agreement’s validity in court. On the other side, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the Justice Department, the
General Pharmaceuticals Association, and the Natural Resources
21
Defense Council filed amicus briefs for the licensee. The Justice
Department argued that invalid patents hurt efficient licensing, hinder
22
competition, and undermine incentives for innovation. The efficiency
arguments were persuasive and led eight members of the Court to
find for the licensee. However, the opinion focused almost entirely on
the jurisdictional issue. An eight-member majority opinion found that
courts have jurisdiction in this case. The sole dissenter was Justice
Thomas.
The main issue before the Court was whether MedImmune
23
alleged a contractual dispute. In order to discuss subject matter
jurisdiction, the majority opinion first clarified the underlying “nature

20. Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673–74 (1969).
21. Alex Lash, Patent Ruling Roils Biotech World, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 11, 2007.
22. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, MedImmune,
127 S. Ct. 764 (No. 05-608); see generally Federal Trade Comm’n, “To Promote Innovation: The
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy” (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (last visited January 10, 2007); U.S. Dep’t of
Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property” (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf (last visited
January 10, 2007); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Report of the Department of Justice’s Task
Force on Intellectual Property” (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/ip_task_force_
report.pdf (last visited January 10, 2007).
23. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5, MedImmune,
127 S. Ct. 764 (No. 05-608).
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24
of the case.” Although not an issue for the Court, Scalia’s opinion
dismisses Genentech’s contention that no factual dispute existed
regarding whether Synagis infringed the Cabilly II patent.25
Furthermore, Justice Scalia challenged the respondent’s allegation
that royalties are due under the licensing agreement for an infringing
product whether or not the underlying patent is valid.26
Delving into the jurisdictional question, the Court discussed the
requirements of Article III and the Declaratory Judgment Act. Article
III of the Constitution limits judicial power for the adjudication of
cases only to “cases” or “controversies.” In the past, the Court
interpreted this requirement as limiting federal court jurisdiction only
to cases in which resolution is “in a concrete factual context
conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial
action” and “outside “the rarefied atmosphere of a debating society.”27
In other words, the judiciary’s function is not to opine on hypothetical
disputes. The Declaratory Judgment Act, in accordance with the
strictures of Article III, permits federal court decisions only “[i]n a
case of actual controversy.”28 The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act in Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Haworth, where it limited justiciability to controversies that
“are such in the constitutional sense.”29 A constitutionally justiciable
30
controversy is not abstract, hypothetical, academic, or moot. There
must be adequate circumstances to prove “there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a

24. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 769.
25. Id. (“The first point simply does not comport with the allegations of petitioner’s
amended complaint. The very first count requested a ‘DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON
CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS,’ and stated that petitioner ‘disputes its
obligation to make payments under the 1997 License Agreement because [petitioner’s] sale of
its Synagis product does not infringe any valid claim of the [Cabilly II] Patent.’) (citations
omitted).
26. Id. at 769–70 (“We express no opinion on whether a nonrepudiating licensee is similarly
relieved of its contract obligation during a successful challenge to a patent’s validity.”)
(emphasis in original).
27. Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (1993).
29. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hayworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).
30. Id. at 240-41 (citing U.S. v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920)).
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31
declaratory judgment.” In other words, there must be a real,
immediate legal dispute between adverse parties.
The crux of this case was whether there was an actual controversy
sufficient to meet the requirements of Article III and the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The Court pointed out that petitioner clearly would
have met these requirements “if petitioner had taken the final step of
32
refusing to pay royalty payments under the 1997 license agreement.”
Theoretically, if MedImmune continued to make royalty payments it
would not yet be vulnerable to immediate harm by way of a suit for
enforcement or an enjoinment of the sale of its products. Without the
immediacy of harm, the matter’s justiciability was uncertain because
no actual controversy creating subject matter jurisdiction had yet
arisen.33 But for the petitioner continuing to make royalty payments
under protest, there would be an actual controversy and all of the
necessary elements were present for proper judicial resolution of the
dispute.
Justice Scalia drew an analogy to this problem by comparing it to
a more familiar occurrence, a suit for a declaratory judgment under
threat of action by the government. Often, such actions occur in the
First Amendment context. For example, a petitioner need not breach
a law banning the distribution of handbills before bringing a suit to
34
challenge its basis. In such a circumstance, the challenge is justiciable
regardless of whether the handbills were ever distributed or if the
petitioner ever faced prosecution. This is because “the declaratory
judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal
activity.”35 Thus, an individual seeking declaratory relief against
government action can continue to abide by the law while
simultaneously challenging the validity of that law.
Although declaratory judgments by private parties against the
government in the mentioned example, there are few Supreme Court
cases interpreting the Declaratory Judgment Act as applied to two

31. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
32. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 764, 771–72 (2007).
33. Id. at 772 n. 8 (“The justiciability problem that arises, when the party seeking
declaratory relief is himself preventing the complained-of injury from occurring, can be
described in terms of standing . . . or in terms of ripeness.”).
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 480 (1974) (J. Rehnquist, concurring)).
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private parties. In fact, the majority only located one case, Altvater v.
36
Freeman, which was decided over sixty years ago.
Altvater’s fact pattern bears striking similarities to MedImmune.
Like MedImmune, Altvater involved a licensee who paid royalties
under protest and simultaneously sought a declaratory judgment to
find the underlying patents invalid. The Court held there was a
justiciable case or controversy despite the fact that royalties were
being paid. If the licensee were not allowed to challenge the patent
while continuing to pay royalties, the only alternative would be to
bring suit and “risk not only actual but treble damages in
37
infringement suits.” The Court held that requiring a licensee to
breach a licensing agreement in order to challenge the validity of the
underlying patent was too burdensome on the licensee. If payments
are made in response to coercive behavior, those payments are not
seen as eliminating all controversies. Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc. was
decided with this case in mind. In Gen-Probe, the Federal Circuit
limited the scope of Altvater’s holding to only those situations where a
threat of injunction exists. In MedImmune, the Court determines that
the Federal Circuit read the Altvater holding too narrowly.38
Like the suit against the government, the Court held that a dispute
between two private parties over the validity of a licensing agreement
meets the jurisdictional requirements of Article III and the
Declaratory Judgment Act. The parties’ dispute is real and immediate
because both sides disagree about their legal obligations to one
39
another. Although the petitioner continued to pay the royalties that
were allegedly due under the licensing agreement, it only did so
because of the enormous gamble associated with having to breach the
agreement in order to challenge the validity of the underlying patent.
To require the petitioner to “bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble
damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a
declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in
Article III.”40
Furthermore, the existence of a licensing agreement does not
preclude the contracting party from challenging the validity of the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943).
Id. at 365.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774.
Id. at 768–69.
Id. at 775.
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intellectual property at issue. A valid licensing agreement
memorializing a promise to pay royalties does not represent a
guarantee that the licensee will not seek a court order holding the
41
underlying patents invalid.
Finally, the majority declined to apply the common law principle
of contracts that one “cannot at one and the same time challenge [a
42
contract’s] validity and continue to reap its benefits.” The Court
found that to reach this common law doctrine would be to decide the
case on the merits, while the case before the Court in MedImmune
simply dealt with the jurisdictional question.
IV. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. takes an aggressive stand in
favor of policing the patent system by allowing the courts to grant
declaratory relief before a licensee ceases to pay royalties. Some
observers have alleged that the Patent and Trademark Office is
overburdened, causing it to grant many patents of questionable
validity.43 By allowing licensees to challenge these questionable
patents without having to “bet the farm,” MedImmune encourages the
use of litigation and market mechanisms to establish the validity of
patents and intellectual property. Although less efficient than denying
a patent outright at the application stage, the decision removes some
of the deadweight loss associated with patents whose validity is never
challenged because licensees would rather play it safe than risk treble
damages. Because licensees are often the only parties with the
financial incentives to challenge a patent’s validity, they are likely the
most appropriate party to bring a challenge. This is consistent with a
rising tide of patent “reform” bills that have recently been proposed
at the congressional level, which are aimed at increasing the
availability of post-grant review of patents.44

41. Id. at 776.
42. Id.
43. Press Release, Cooley Godward Kronish LLP, “MedImmune v. Genentech: A Dilemma
Removed for Patent Licensees” (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://www.cooley.com/news/
alerts.aspx?ID=40494620.
44. See, e.g., H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (“Patent Reform Act of 2005”) (which would
strengthen allowable procedures for the review of patents after they are granted by the Patent
and Trademark Office).

2008__07 -- OHANIAN__FMT.DOC

2007]

MEDIMMUNE, INC. V. GENENTECH, INC.

12/30/2008 4:36:32 PM

71

By removing a procedural hurdle, the decision also helps protect
smaller companies who may be exploited by larger companies with
stronger patent portfolios. Typically, licensees are small businesses or
start-up companies that, in order to enter a given market, must license
the patents of larger companies, who have substantial research and
development budgets. Often, the licensing agreements group together
a large collection of patents. These groupings can prevent the smaller
licensee companies from examining or challenging each patent’s
validity or applicability due to limited financial resources. High
business risks often dissuade smaller and newer companies from
breaching a licensing agreement in order to challenge a patent’s
validity. A judgment of willful infringement of a patent may lead to
treble damages or punitive damages. Arguably, the pre-MedImmune
incentive structure punished companies who lacked power or
financial resources by chaining them to invalid patents.
The Court’s decision in MedImmune shifts the balance of power
from bigger patent-owning companies to the smaller start-up
companies that rely on obtaining licenses for patented technology.45
Now, patent licensees may be more inclined to reevaluate the patents
for which they are paying royalties and decide to challenge the
validity of those patents while paying the royalties under protest. The
Court’s holding is limited, however, because licensees must be under
sufficient threat of litigation by the licensor in order to create a case
or controversy before challenging the validity of the patent at issue
via litigation. A letter threatening enforcement of obligations under a
licensing agreement was deemed sufficient in MedImmune to create a
controversy for purposes of Article III. Presumably, notice of
termination of a licensing agreement would also meet this
requirement. This could lead to an interesting situation in which a
licensee attempts to induce a licensor to threaten suit by sending a
notice of termination of the licensing agreement to force the licensor
to abandon the licensing agreement or else risk a challenge to the
patent’s validity.
The tension between patent owners and licensees led to
vociferous debate among the many amicus in the case. According to
the numerous amicus briefs presented on behalf of the respondent, a

45. Linda Greenhouse, U.S. Supreme Court Favors Companies that Rely on Others’ Patents,
INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 10, 2007.
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decision for the licensee would serve to diminish the value of
intellectual property owned by big-branded drug makers, universities,
46
and other companies. Amicus briefs on behalf of the respondent
cited examples including the impact on research universities and
other non-commercial enterprises, suggesting that substantial harm
would ensue if licensees are permitted to challenge a patent’s validity
47
without breaching the underlying licensing agreement. Universities
and non-commercial research entities might become discouraged
from licensing their inventions because they cannot afford the
potential liability associated with a challenge to the patent’s validity.
Because universities are major contributors to intellectual property,
an event that dissuades them from licensing their inventions could
harm the availability of many important technological advances. In
other words, inventors will become wary of licensing their inventions
and the public will suffer.
Both MedImmune’s critics and supporters believe that the
decision will change the nature of licensing agreements. Leading
patent attorneys predict that patent owners may include provisions in
their licensing agreements that will invalidate the agreement if the
licensee challenges one of the licensed patents.48 In fact, during the
oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that there might be
some way of legally structuring licensing agreements to diminish the
threat of a lawsuit by the licensee.49
The enforceability of such contract provisions is the source of
great debate. In the past, U.S. courts generally have favored parties’
private agreements that avoid or limit litigation, but covenants
promising not to challenge the validity of a patent run counter to the
underlying policy reasons animating the decision in MedImmune.
However, the enforceability of such provisions was not addressed in
the opinion, and this will most certainly be an area of contention in
the future.

46. Patti Waldmeir, Supreme Court Acts on Patents Legal Challenges, THE FINANCIAL
TIMES (UK), Jan. 10, 2007.
47. Id.
48. High Court Plows Barrier Generics Encounter Challenging Patents, FDA WEEK, Jan.
12, 2007, Section 2.
49. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc, 127 S. Ct. 764
(No. 05-608).
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The Court did not determine the underlying validity of the Cabilly
II patent, but simply gave the petitioner the right to pursue its lawsuit
in lower courts. MedImmune, Inc., in a press release following the
decision, promised to pursue its original complaint “vigorously” at the
50
lower court level.

50. Press Release, MedImmune, Inc., “MedImmune Issues Statement Regarding Supreme
Court Decision” (Jan. 9, 2007), available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=
83037&p=irol-investornewsArticle&ID=948671&highlight= (last visited January 10, 2007).

